This document gathers what can actually be established about the trading journal market as of August 2026. It contains no projection: every number is either audited in a regulatory filing, filed with a company register, read off a public counter, or explicitly flagged as a third-party estimate. The final sections state what we do not know.
A trading journal is a correction tool. Its reason to exist rests on a fact documented at length by academic research, and by regulators themselves: the overwhelming majority of retail traders lose money, and part of those losses comes from behaviour the trader cannot see.
The most complete study covers an entire national market. Analysing every day trader in Taiwan from 1992 to 2006, Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean conclude that less than 1% of the day trader population is able to predictably and reliably earn positive abnormal returns net of fees1. The spread between the best and the rest is wide: the 500 top-ranked traders of one year go on to earn 37.9 basis points per day after fees the following year, while bottom-ranked traders earn −28.9.
The result replicates on another continent and another product. Using data from the Brazilian regulator, Chague, De-Losso and Giovannetti followed every individual who began day trading equity index futures between 2013 and 2015. Among those who persisted for more than 300 days, 97% lost money; 1.1% earned more than the Brazilian minimum wage, and 0.5% more than a bank teller's starting salary2.
Regulators measure the same thing on their own markets. France's AMF collected the results of 14,799 active CFD and Forex clients across the main French intermediaries, over a four-year observation window: more than 89% of clients lost money, with an average result of −€10,887 per client, a median of −€1,843, and a total of −€161,115,4933. Four years later ESMA justified its CFD restriction with national analyses showing that 74 to 89% of retail accounts lose money, with average losses per client of €1,600 to €29,0004.
That is the exact niche of a trading journal: accelerating the first kind of learning, for the trader who stays, by making visible what he cannot see about himself. No study to date measures the effect of a structured journal on an individual's performance, and that has to be said as plainly as the rest.
The common flaw of every study of this market is mixing numbers that do not have the same value. This document separates them, and every table below carries the column.
| Level | What it is | Example in this document |
|---|---|---|
| AUDITED | Published in a regulatory or investor-relations document, binding on a listed issuer | Robinhood Gold subscribers, eToro funded accounts, Interactive Brokers accounts |
| FILED | Accounts filed with a company register, enforceable against third parties | TRADE LIKE A PRO S.R.L., €119,567 in 2025, Romanian register |
| COUNTED | Public counter that cannot be manipulated, read directly and tracked over time | Android downloads tracked daily, App Store ratings |
| ESTIMATE | Commercial algorithm, method not published, not reproducible | Revenue estimates from B2B databases |
| CLAIMED | Asserted by the company, unverifiable, and often inconsistent with itself | “100,000+ traders”, “52k+” |
This is the only genuinely solid layer of the study, because it comes from listed companies that are legally accountable for these numbers.
In the second quarter of 2026 Robinhood reports 4.8 million Gold subscribers, up 1.4 million year over year, or 17% of its 28.4 million funded customers. Roughly 40% of new funded customers sign up for Gold in their first quarter6.
Robinhood is the US commission-free broker that opened stock trading to a generation of retail investors. Gold is its paid subscription, at $5 a month, or $50 to $60 a year7. It does not buy access to the market, access is free: it adds tools and perks around it. Nasdaq Level II market depth, that is the order book rather than just the best price. A research assistant. Larger instant deposits. A better yield on idle cash. A 3% retirement-account match. A reduced margin borrowing rate.
No sector study exists for trading journals, and the two consultancy reports found on adjacent scopes give $11.285 billion and $6.5 billion for the same year, a 74% gap: they do not measure the same thing and neither describes this market. The total below is therefore not measured, it is built, and the whole construction is shown so that it can be redone or challenged.
The market leader is a US LLC: it files accounts nowhere, and no agency has better. But a company that declares itself profitable has to cover payroll, infrastructure and marketing before it books a margin. That cost floor can be quantified, and it bounds revenue from below and from above. It is the only method available, and to our knowledge nobody has applied it to this market.
| What is known about it | Value read | Level |
|---|---|---|
| Headcount | between 26 and 50: 26 profiles claim the company, the declared bracket is 11-508 | COUNTED |
| Headquarters and form | New York, privately held, founded 20228 | COUNTED |
| Funding | no round raised, “bootstrapped”9 | CLAIMED |
| Profitability | “highly profitable”9 | CLAIMED |
| Way of working | “100% Remote & Async-First: Work from anywhere”9 | CLAIMED |
| Prices charged | $288 to $891 a year, no permanent free plan10 | COUNTED |
| Charting library | TradingView charting_library, in the served application10 | COUNTED |
The calculation fits on one line. If R is revenue, then R × (1 − marketing % − payment fees % − margin %) = payroll + infrastructure + licences. Payment fees are taken at 3%, infrastructure at $250,000, the charting licence at $145,000 (see below), marketing at 18% and net margin at 40%, which matches a mature, profitable vendor sold without a sales team. That leaves one unknown, and it decides everything: headcount.
| Headcount retained | All on New York pay $160k fully loaded | Half in the US, half elsewhere $160k and $75k |
|---|---|---|
| 26, the floor: profiles claiming the company | $11.7M | $8.8M |
| 38, the middle of the declared bracket | $16.6M | $12.5M |
| 50, the top of the declared bracket | $21.5M | $16.1M |
The right-hand column exists because the careers page says “work from anywhere” and an engineer from the Eastern-European agency Railsware appears in the employee list shown on the company page. Reality sits between the two columns, and between the three rows.
The whole market figure hangs on one unknown: the leader's headcount
The leader is a US LLC and files no accounts. Its revenue is reconstructed from its costs, and the only unstable parameter is the number of people it pays.
How to read this: 26 is a floor, the LinkedIn profiles declaring they work there; 50 is the top of the bracket the company declares itself. The calculation includes the $145,000-a-year charting licence, marketing at 18% of revenue, 3% payment fees and a 40% net margin.
The cost model alone leaves a wide range, because the exact headcount of a US LLC is published nowhere. Three further methods, sharing no parameter with it, close the range. It is their agreement, not any one of them, that yields the figure.
| Method | What it assumes | What it yields |
|---|---|---|
| A. From costs | 50 employees on New York pay, 40% margin | $21.5M |
| B. From the claimed base | 100,000 claimed accounts, only half of them paying today, at $400 a year | $20.0M |
| C. From the valuation | ~$100M announced in 202311, at a 4x to 5x revenue multiple | $20M to $25M |
| D. From the charting licence | $145,000 a year representing 0.5% to 0.75% of revenue | $19M to $29M |
None of these four methods shares a parameter with the others. The first starts from salaries, the second from a displayed counter, the third from a financial multiple, the fourth from a supplier's invoice.
TradingView's Advanced Charts library is announced as “Free and feature-rich” on its public page12. What that page does not say is the condition, nor the rate when the condition is not met. Both were written to us in black and white.
That rate applies to the leader. Its application contains the string charting_library, and its pricing page offers no permanent free plan10: the chart there is therefore not reachable without paying. It falls under the commercial regime, or it is out of line with its licence. The line is carried into the model.
What remains is to go from the leader to the total, and that is where the last gap sits. B2B databases assign the leader 46% of the value, which would give $48M. But in a market counting more than sixty iOS apps and some twenty web products, a 46% share for a single player is a strong assumption. At 40% the market is $55M, at 35% it is $63M, at 30% it is $73M. The value retained here is $55M, which assumes the leader holds two fifths of its market. The order of magnitude does not move in any scenario: tens of millions of dollars a year, not billions. A player reaching $6M in annual revenue would be second worldwide.
The clean way out is to add the players up one by one instead of dividing by an assumed share. That measurement is under way, vendor by vendor, using the section 4.1 grid: listed prices, legal entity, filed accounts where the country requires them, headcount, installed base. The total published here will be revised from that sum, and the revision will be dated and flagged as one, including if it contradicts us.
The market's value, player by player
A $42M-a-year market, obtained by adding up fifteen vendors measured one by one. Summing only the low values gives $33M; summing the high ones gives $52M. The middle is retained, because every input of the measurement is a floor. It is no longer obtained by dividing the leader's revenue by an assumed share. The percentage shares are estimates; the total they derive from is built in section 4, where the calculation is shown.
How to read this: the shares come from B2B databases whose method is not published, except TradesViz's, corrected downwards by its own filing with the Indian register. ⛔ These shares are no longer database estimates: they are the revenues reconstructed player by player, expressed against their sum. The leader's share, 47%, is derived from the measurement, not assumed. It lands squarely between the 46% the B2B databases assign it and the 55% the sum of floors gives, the file's first point of agreement between our own measurement and an outside source.
We queried eighteen sector-research publishers, opening and reading their pages: Grand View Research, Fortune Business Insights, Verified Market Reports, Market Research Future, IMARC, Business Research Insights, Cognitive Market Research, QYResearch, 360iResearch, DataIntelo, Research and Markets, MarketsandMarkets, Future Market Insights, Straits, Credence, Coherent, Polaris and The Business Research Company. Not one has a report whose stated scope is the trading journal. On the exact query “trading journal software market”, the only results are consumer product comparisons. This is not a research gap, it is this document's central finding: any figure presented as the size of the trading journal market necessarily comes from another market.
The figures circulating about this market, and what they actually measure
None of these reports covers trading journals. The first three are homonyms: in them the word “journal” means an academic periodical, a personal diary, or a customs file.
How to read this: asked how big the trading journal market is, a search engine answers “$9.4 billion by 2036”. That is the figure from the Trade Management Software report, whose own page defines its object as “tariff classification and customs documentation before goods move across borders”. Customs compliance. Neither “Journal” report is about trading either: counting the words “trading” and “trader” on their pages returns zero.
That last one is the most dangerous, because it already circulates under our name. Asked how big the trading journal market is, a search engine answers word for word: “The trading journal market is projected to reach USD 9.4 billion by 2036 at 12% CAGR”. That is the customs-compliance report's figure. Quoting that number means being several billion dollars wrong about a market that has nothing to do with financial trading.
Invest and Forex, visible leftovers of automated extraction, and its page carries “Share at: ChatGPT / Perplexity / Grok” buttons whose link explicitly asks to “keep the domain noted for future referencing”. A caveat does not repair a figure that contradicts itself: this one cannot be cited, not even carefully.Two firms then give $5.54 billion and $0.11 billion for a near-identical scope, consumer journaling apps: a fiftyfold gap between two professionals on the same object. The two cancel each other out.
An estimate whose calculation cannot be redone is worth nothing. Here, in one place, is every assumption that enters the figure, its value and its status. Change one and the total moves: that is the point.
| Assumption | Value retained | Status | What happens if it is wrong |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net margin of a mature vendor | 40% | CONVENTION | At 60%, the whole cost table doubles |
| Marketing | 18% of revenue | CONVENTION | Moderate effect, ±10% on the total |
| Payment fees | 3% of revenue | STANDARD | Negligible |
| Infrastructure per vendor | $250,000 a year | CONVENTION | Negligible for the large, material for the small |
| Fully loaded cost per person | $160k in the US, $120k in Canada and Western Europe, $75k elsewhere | ESTIMATE | ±25% on the cost-model lines |
| Charting licence | $145,000 a year, if charting_library is present and there is no free plan | DOCUMENT | Written by the supplier, not negotiable |
| Each vendor's headcount | between the LinkedIn floor and the top of its declared bracket | COUNTED (floor) | The single most sensitive parameter of the model |
| Share of claimed accounts still paying | 50% at the leader, 4 years old · 15% x 50% at the second, 12 years old | ASSUMPTION | Doubles or halves the lines concerned |
| Average annual subscription actually paid | $250 for the market, $400 at the leader | ESTIMATE | Proportional on the derived subscriber count |
| Scope | trading journals sold direct to consumers | DEFINED | Including prop firms changes the object: FTMO alone is $329M |
The lines marked CONVENTION are measured at no vendor. They are imposed by the method, identically for all, which keeps comparisons between vendors valid even where the absolute level is not.
No growth rate is published for this category, since no research firm measures it. It therefore has to be built, and bounded by what is measurable on either side.
| Signal | Value | Level |
|---|---|---|
| Paying tool subscribers at the largest US broker | 4.8M, +39% year over year | AUDITED |
| Funded customers at the same broker | 28.4M, +7% year over year | AUDITED |
| Interactive Brokers accounts | 5.185M, +34% year over year | AUDITED |
| Funded accounts at prop firms | 32,000 in 2020 to 720,000 in 2026 | ESTIMATE |
| Monthly searches for the term prop firm | 880 to 49,500 in five years | COUNTED |
| Neighbouring backtesting software market | $444M to $834M from 2025 to 2032, +9.41% a year | ESTIMATE |
What the market would be worth at three different growth rates
No growth rate is published for this category, since no research firm measures it. The three slopes below are bounded by the only published rate of a neighbouring market at the bottom, and by measured demand signals at the top.
How to read this: the lower bound is not invented, it is the rate from 360iResearch's Backtesting Software report, the only neighbour for which a firm publishes a projection. The upper bound stays well below the measured demand signals: the largest US broker's paying subscribers grow 39% a year, and funded accounts at prop firms have multiplied twenty-twofold in six years. ⚠️ These curves start from the $55M estimate; the $33M floor follows the same slope and would reach $73M by 2033 at the retained rate.
12% a year is retained. The floor is the only rate actually published for a neighbouring market, backtesting software at 9.41%: our category is younger and far less penetrated, it should not grow more slowly. The 15% ceiling stays well below the measured demand signals, the strongest of which is a 39% annual rise in paying tool subscribers. This is not a cautious rate out of caution, it is cautious because the conversion of a tool payer into a journal subscriber is measured nowhere.
| Year | At the neighbour's rate, +9.4% | At the rate retained, +12% | If penetration accelerates, +15% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | $55M | $55M | $55M |
| 2028 | $66M | $69M | $73M |
| 2030 | $79M | $87M | $96M |
| 2033 | $103M | $122M | $146M |
The measured floor of $33M follows the same slope: it would reach $52M by 2030 and $73M by 2033 at the retained rate.
This is the sharpest finding of the survey: the web, the iPhone and Android are three separate markets with three different leaders. Online comparisons cover only one of them, the web, and ignore the other two.
| Player | Listed annual price | Share of value | Revenue | Level |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TradeZella | $288 to $891 | ~40% | ~$22M | ESTIMATE |
| Edgewonk | ~$169 | ~15% | ~$8M | ESTIMATE |
| TraderSync | $270 to $720 | ~10% | ~$5.5M | ESTIMATE |
| Tradervue | $324 to $599 | ~8% | ~$4.4M | ESTIMATE |
| TradesViz | $179 to $270 | ~1.5% corrected | €455k to €909k | FILED |
Prices read from public pages on 3 August 2026. The revenue figures are the value shares applied to the total in section 4: they follow from it, they do not found it. Only the TradesViz line comes from a filing.
Recorded on 3 August 2026 through the App Store public API, six search terms crossed with seven countries, filtered on the Finance category: 65 distinct apps, 2,123 cumulative ratings19. Android downloads have been tracked daily since 3 July, which gives a rate rather than just a total20.
| Player | iOS ratings | Android downloads | Publisher |
|---|---|---|---|
| SuperTrader | 1,158 (55%) | not tracked | TRADE LIKE A PRO S.R.L., Romania |
| kinfo | 464 (22%) | 10,000+ | KINFO AB, Sweden |
| TraderSync | 84 · rated 2.71 | 75,418 | 1473010 ALBERTA LTD, Canada |
| Plancana | 78 | 63,686 · 191 per day | Plancana Inc. |
| UltraTrader | 56 | 69,418 · 92 per day | an individual, not a company |
| TradesViz | — | 33,204 | SMIRMATEC PRIVATE LIMITED, India |
| TradeZella | no app | no app | TradeZella LLC, United States |
Across twenty products examined, three yield a usable revenue figure and a fourth yields a profit floor. That is few, and it is the exact measure of how opaque this market is.
The only genuinely filed revenue figures in the whole market
Across twenty products examined, three yield a usable figure. That is few, and it is the exact measure of how opaque this niche is.
How to read this: the TradesViz bar is a range because its amount is bounded by two opposing tax rules, not by an estimate. The floor comes from the duty to file a GSTR-9C above 5 crore rupees, the ceiling from the “less than 10 crore” bracket declared to the register. And the App Store leader, SuperTrader, makes €119,567 and loses €5,446.
| Financial year | Revenue | Net result |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 (half year) | €7,608 | +€5,968 |
| 2025 | €119,567 | −€5,446 |
TRADE LIKE A PRO S.R.L., CUI 50294964, Romanian register, free and public21.
| Financial year | Revenue | Net result |
|---|---|---|
| 2023 (13.5 months, ~€49,400 annualised) | €55,596 | +€11,623 |
| 2024 | €37,899 | −€6,835 |
| 2025 | €24,319 | −€854 |
WOLFUS OÜ, code 16613740, Estonian register, annual accounts downloadable free of charge22.
Zero employees across the whole period. Cash at 31 December 2025: €4,071, against a €4,305 balance sheet total. The €2,500 of capital was subscribed but never paid in. Purchases of goods and services absorb 73 to 107% of revenue depending on the year, which makes the result near zero by construction rather than by commercial difficulty.
SMIRMATEC PRIVATE LIMITED, India, financial year April 2024 to March 2025: between €455,000 and €909,000. The bounds come from two rules of law, not from an estimate. The floor: filing a GSTR-9C form is only mandatory above 5 crore rupees, and it was filed, so revenue exceeds that threshold. The ceiling: the bracket declared to the register is “less than 10 crore”. Growth of +77%, after +114% the previous year23.
Wallace FX Ltd, England, files under the micro-entity regime, verified in the iXBRL files themselves: there will never be an income statement, only a balance sheet. What can be derived: equity going from £91 in 2023 to £40,554 in 2024 and £49,923 in 2025, implying a net result of at least +£40,512 then +£9,369, with one employee24.
| Player | Legal form | Why revenue is inaccessible |
|---|---|---|
| TradeZella | LLC, United States | US LLCs file no accounts at all |
| TraderWaves | Ltd, United Kingdom | Micro-entity regime: balance sheet only, never an income statement |
| UltraTrader | an individual | Exists in no company register |
| Edgely | sole trader, France | No filing, but a legal ceiling of €77,700 to €83,600 bounds the player |
| Edgyx | SAS, France | Incorporated 1 December 2025, €1,000 capital, no employees |
This is the most counter-intuitive finding of the file. The three largest players by claimed account count are together worth less than 5% of the market's value.
Audience and value do not point to the same players
This is the most counter-intuitive finding of the file. ⛔ The audience numbers are not comparable with each other: some are install counters read directly, others are accounts claimed by the vendor. The level of proof is written under each name, and that is the whole point of the figure.
How to read this: the three largest claimed audiences in the market are together worth less than one million dollars, because all three are free or nearly so. TraderWaves is the clearest illustration: it claims more than 52,000 traders on a free plan and draws a six-figure monthly audience, and its UK filing bounds its net result at around £9,000 with one employee. Conversely Edgewonk has no mobile app at all and captures a high share of value through a flat price. ✅ The “not measured” cells of the first version have been filled: the fourteen vendors were each quantified on 23 August 2026, and their revenues now appear in the right-hand column.
The market for capital allocated to retail traders is on a different scale from the journal market, and it is its main supplier of constrained users. The figures below come from trade press and sector sites, not from filings: they are given at the ESTIMATE level and sometimes contradict each other threefold.
| Indicator | Value | Level |
|---|---|---|
| FTMO 2024 revenue | $329M (+53%), net profit $62.5M | ESTIMATE |
| Funded accounts worldwide | 32,000 in 2020 → 720,000 in 2026 | ESTIMATE |
| Challenge purchases per year | ~12M at ~$250, i.e. ~$3B | ESTIMATE |
| Monthly Google searches for “prop firm” | 880 → 49,500 in five years | COUNTED |
What makes this segment structurally interesting is not its size but the nature of the need. A trader on a challenge must respect a maximum daily loss, a maximum drawdown and often a size-consistency rule. Tracking his trades stops being a voluntary discipline and becomes a condition of the account's survival. It is the only population in this market whose need is imposed rather than chosen, and that is what sets it apart.
AUDITED numbers come from listed issuers' own documents, linked in the notes. FILED numbers come from national company registers, with the entity identifier so anyone can redo the search. COUNTED numbers come from public APIs or counters read on a stated date, with the protocol. ESTIMATE numbers are flagged as such everywhere they appear.
If a number on this page is wrong, it is wrong in a verifiable way, and that is deliberate. Corrections received are published, dated, and the previous error stays visible: a study rewritten in silence is worth no more than a marketing counter.
Every source links to its original document. The links open the issuer's, regulator's, register's or journal's own site, never a second-hand write-up.
Brad M. Barber, Yi-Tsung Lee, Yu-Jane Liu, Terrance Odean, “The cross-section of speculator skill: Evidence from day trading”, Journal of Financial Markets, vol. 18, 2014, pp. 1-24.
Open the source ↗Fernando Chague, Rodrigo De-Losso, Bruno Giovannetti, “Day trading for a living?”, 13 June 2020, SSRN 3423101. Data provided by CVM, the Brazilian regulator.
Open the source ↗Autorité des marchés financiers (French markets regulator), “Étude des résultats des investisseurs particuliers sur le trading de CFD et de Forex en France”, 13 October 2014.
Open the source ↗European Securities and Markets Authority, press release ESMA71-98-128, “ESMA agrees to prohibit binary options and restrict CFDs to protect retail investors”, 27 March 2018.
Open the source ↗Amit Seru, Tyler Shumway, Noah Stoffman, “Learning by Trading”, The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 23, no. 2, February 2010, pp. 705-739.
Open the source ↗Robinhood Markets, Inc., “Robinhood Reports Second Quarter 2026 Results”, investor relations, 29 July 2026.
Open the source ↗Robinhood, official Gold page: a $5-a-month subscription, i.e. $50 to $60 a year. It provides Nasdaq Level II market depth, a research assistant, larger instant deposits, a better yield on uninvested cash, a 3% retirement-account match and a reduced margin borrowing rate. Read on 23 August 2026.
Open the source ↗The leading vendor's LinkedIn company page. Two distinct numbers appear on it, and conflating them breaks everything: the served page's structured data carries numberOfEmployees = 26, which counts LinkedIn profiles declaring they work there, hence a floor; the page separately shows the company-declared bracket, “11-50 employees”. New York headquarters, privately held, founded 2022. Read on 23 August 2026.
The leading vendor's careers page: “We're a bootstrapped, remote-first team, highly profitable” and “100% Remote & Async-First: Work from anywhere”. Read on 23 August 2026.
Open the source ↗The leader's application, HTML served on 23 August 2026: the string charting_library appears in it, evidencing use of TradingView's Advanced Charts library. Its pricing page offers no permanent free plan.
Public mention of a “near $100 million” valuation for the leading vendor, relayed from a founder podcast interview dated May 2023. ⚠️ This is a founder statement relayed by a media outlet, not a funding round and not an audited document: it serves as a cross-check on the order of magnitude, never as a measurement. Read on 23 August 2026.
Open the source ↗TradingView, official Advanced Charts page, presenting the library as “Free and feature-rich”. The price of a commercial licence is published nowhere.
Open the source ↗Email from Álvaro M. Roo, Customer Success Manager at TradingView, sent on 8 July 2026 to the publisher of this study, in reply to a request for access to Advanced Charts: “For Private access or internal use, a commercial license is required. Price ranges around +$145,000 USD / year. Please let me know if you are interested. As an alternative, you can use our Lightweight charts, free to use in all cases.” Non-public document, quoted in full for the part that carries the figure.
Open the source ↗DataIntelo, “Journal Software Market” report. Object: academic and scholarly publishing, manuscript submission, peer review, open access. Players: Elsevier, Springer Nature, Wiley, Taylor & Francis. Word count on the served page: “trading” 0 occurrences, “trader” 0 occurrences. Read on 23 August 2026.
Open the source ↗Business Research Insights, “Journal App Market” report. Object: digital personal journaling, mental wellbeing, productivity. Players: Day One, Journey, Penzu, Daylio, Momento. Word count on the served page: “trading” and “trader”, 0 occurrences. Read on 23 August 2026.
Open the source ↗Future Market Insights, “Trade Management Software Market” report, whose page defines the measured object as “platforms that help companies manage cross-border trade work… tariff classification and customs documentation before goods move across borders”. Players listed: SAP, Oracle, WiseTech, Descartes, Avalara. Read on 23 August 2026.
Open the source ↗Verified Market Reports, “Trading Software Market” report. The page contradicts itself on the day it was read: the visible text announces $12.59B to $25.75B at 9.38%, while the structured-data block of the same page declares $6.5B to $12.1B at 7.2%. Four different horizons and five sale prices coexist on the same document. Read on 23 August 2026.
Open the source ↗360iResearch, “Backtesting Software Market” report, published August 2026, 198 pages, reference MRR-430D42AA0E05: $444.16M in 2025 to $833.83M in 2032, 9.41% annual growth. Read on 23 August 2026.
Open the source ↗Apple App Store public search API, 6 terms crossed with 7 countries, filtered on the Finance category, read on 3 August 2026: 65 distinct apps, 2,123 cumulative ratings.
Open the source ↗Google Play Store download counters, tracked daily from 3 July to 3 August 2026, which gives the rate and not only the cumulative total.
Open the source ↗Romanian trade register, TRADE LIKE A PRO S.R.L., CUI 50294964, registered J39/491/2024 on 28 June 2024 in Focșani (Vrancea). 2024 and 2025 accounts, read on 3 August 2026.
Open the source ↗Estonian Business Register (e-Äriregister), WOLFUS OÜ, code 16613740. Annual accounts 2023 to 2025, “Müügitulu” line of the income statement, read on 3 August 2026.
Open the source ↗Ministry of Corporate Affairs (India), SMIRMATEC PRIVATE LIMITED, CIN U72900TN2021PTC141817, financial year April 2024 to March 2025, read on 3 August 2026. Bounds derived from two tax rules, not from an estimate.
Open the source ↗Companies House (United Kingdom), Wallace FX Ltd, no. 14073236, micro-entity filings 2023 to 2025, read from the iXBRL files, on 3 August 2026.
Open the source ↗These figures are free to reuse, competitors included, on the single condition of a link back to this page. If you cite us, we want to be able to correct your source when we correct ours.
Tradoshi, “The trading journal market in 2026”, Trading Journal Research, 23 August 2026, https://tradoshi.com/en/research/trading-journal-market-2026